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This paper provides a simple variation of the basic ideas of
the BB84 quantum cryptographic scheme leading to a method
of key expansion. A secure random sequence ( the bases se-
quence ) determines the encoding bases in a proposed scheme.
Using the bases sequence repeatedly is proven to be safe by
quantum mechanical laws.
One of the most intriguing and exiting recent devel-
opments in quantum mechanics has been the prediction
and demonstration of a cryptographic key distribution
scheme, the security of which is guaranteed by the laws
of quantum mechanics [1]. Theoretical models for the
quantum key distributions ( quantum cryptography ) has
been based on the uncertainty principle [2], EPR states
[3], two nonorthogonal states [4] and Wheeler’s delayed
choice experiment [5]. In all the proposed quantum cryp-
tographies [1]- [5], there are public announcement steps
at which Alice ( the sender ) and Bob ( the receiver ) ex-
changes some informations on their operations via clas-
sical channel. Eve ( the eavesdropper ) has full access to
the announced information on the classical channel but
she can listen only and cannot tamper with the signals.
In the first public discussion step of the standard BB84
scheme [2], the bases on which Alice ( Bob ) encoded (
measured ) signals are announced each other.
In this paper, a variation of the BB84 scheme is pro-
posed in which the public discussion of bases is not
needed, although later public discussions for error de-
tection and ’privacy amplification’ [6,7] is still necessary.
Elimination of one public discussion step is an advan-
tage by itself. Furthermore, it reduces information about
bases to which Eve has access, which can be utilized in
sophisticated eavesdropping strategy [8]- [13].
This paper is organized as follows. First, a simple
form of quantum cryptography and it’s weak point are
presented. Next, it is described how this weak point is
overcome in BB84 scheme [2]. After this introduction,
a new method to overcome the weak point of the sim-
ple quantum cryptography is proposed. It is shown that
implementation of this method enables a quantum cryp-
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tography without public announcement of bases.
Let us consider the following simple quantum cryptog-
raphy. Alice sends to Bob some quantum carriers ( spin- 1
2
particles or photons ) on which the 1-bit information is
encoded; Alice encodes 0 and 1 on |u+〉 and |u−〉, respec-
tively, where |u+〉 ( |u−〉 ) is the up ( down ) eigenstate
of spin-measurement along axis u which is known to only
Alice and Bob. Since Alice and Bob use the same axis u,
there is perfect correlation between the binary random
sequence that Alice encoded and the one that Bob has
retrieved by performing spin-measurement along the axis
u. If Eve intercepts the particles sent to Bob by Alice and
performs some spin-measurement on the particles and re-
sends some particles to Bob later, then she inevitably will
introduce some errors on the correlation between Alice’s
and Bob’s. Eve can extract no information about the
basis u by any physical methods, because the mixture
of |u+〉 and |u−〉 with equal probabilities have a density
operator ρu =
1
2
|u+〉〈u + | + 1
2
|u−〉〈u − | = 1
2
I which
is identical to ρu′ =
1
2
|u′+〉〈u′ + | + 1
2
|u′−〉〈u′ − | = 1
2
I
, where u 6= u′ and I is the identity operator. Thus,
eavesdropping inevitably give rise to error which can be
detected by Alice and Bob, except for the case where Eve
knows the basis u or Eve incidently measures along the
u basis.
This simple quantum cryptography method has a few
weak points. First, there is considerable probability that
Eve incidentally measures along a basis almost similar
to u as there is only one hidden parameter u. In that
case, Eve obtains information on the binary random se-
quence ( key ) introducing negligible errors. Second, Eve
might obtain information about the basis through in-
direct method: she tries an arbitrarily chosen basis in
eavesdropping. If the tried basis is different from the ba-
sis u which Alice and Bob use, then errors are introduced
which Alice and Bob will detect. Alice and Bob will dis-
card the obtained data and start again. Now, Eve knows
that the chosen and tried basis is not the correct basis u.
The described above weak points of simple quantum
cryptography do not exist in BB84 scheme. They were
eliminated in following way. Alice uses randomly one of
two bases u and u′ for encoding ( u and u′ are chosen
z and x in BB84, respectively ) and Bob performs spin-
measurements along basis randomly chosen between u
and u′. After all quantum carriers have arrived at Bob,
Alice and Bob announce publically each other which ba-
sis they chose at each instance. In about half of all the
instances the basis Alice chose are the same as those cho-
1
sen by Bob. In these instances there will be perfect cor-
relation between Alice’s and Bob’s, unless the quantum
carriers were perturbed by Eve or noise. In this way, us-
ing BB84 method, Alice and Bob can prevent Eve from
knowing which basis Alice choose to encode while Eve
has access to quantum carriers. Even if Eve knows about
u and u′, Eve cannot learn anything about which of u
and u′ is chosen by Alice at a particular instance before
the public announcement of bases.
Public announcement of bases is a necessary step in
standard BB84 scheme. However, let us now consider
another shielding method, in which Alice and Bob do
not publically reveal their bases. First, Alice and Bob
share by any method ( by courier or by BB84 scheme
) some secure binary random sequence that is known to
nobody. This random sequence is to be used to determine
the encoding basis u and u′. Alice ( Bob ) encodes (
performs spin-measurement ) on the basis z and x when
it is 0 and 1, respectively. For example, when the bases
random sequence is
0, 1, 1, 0, 1..... (1)
and the signal random sequence that Alice wants to send
to Bob is
1, 0, 1, 0, 1..... (2)
then she sends to him the following quantum carriers
|z−〉, |x+〉, |x−〉, |z+〉, |x−〉, ..... (3)
Since Alice and Bob have common random sequence,
there will be perfect correlation between them unless the
quantum carriers were perturbed by Eve or noise. Eve
is naturally prevented from knowing about the encoding
bases, since she does not know the bases sequence. As
we see, public announcement of bases is not needed in
the proposed scheme. However, the scheme can only be
useful if it is possible to use safely the bases random se-
quence repeatedly. If this is not the case, Alice and Bob
have to consume the same length of random sequences
to obtain some length of new random sequences. Fortu-
nately, quantum mechanical laws enable the bases ran-
dom sequences to be used repeatedly enough, as shown
below.
Suppose Alice used the bases random sequence of N
times ( N is a positive integer ). In order to know about
the bases sequence Eve collects measurement records on
the quantum carriers of all the N times. 1 Next, she re-
arranges the records according to the order of the bases
1In the sophisticated eavesdropping strategy [8]- [13] the
quantum carriers are not measured directly and immediately.
In those strategies, they make the quantum carriers to inter-
act with auxiliary quantum states ( the ancilla ) and they
delay measurements on the ancilla by storing them in quan-
sequence. First, she collects the records of the first one in
each N sequences and label on this set number1,..., next
she collects the records of i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ N , i is an integer
) one in all N sequences and label on this set number i,...
Eve knows that for each set of number i , either z or x
is used for encoding by Alice. Now, Eve tries to obtain
some informations about which basis is used for each set
of number i. If it is possible, Alice and Bob cannot use
the bases sequence repeatedly. However, Eve can obtain
no information about the bases as shown below. When
Alice encodes on z, Eve is given states as, for example,
|z−〉, |z+〉, |z+〉, |z−〉, |z−〉... with equal probabilities of
+ and −. When Alice encodes on x, Eve is given states
as, for example, |x+〉, |x+〉, |x−〉, |x+〉, |x−〉... with equal
probability of + and −. These two ensembles of states
have the same density operator 1
2
|z+〉〈z+ |+ 1
2
|z−〉〈z−|
( = 1
2
|x+〉〈x + | + 1
2
|x−〉〈x − | ). Any two ensembles
that have the same density operator give statistically the
same outcome to any quantum mechanical measurements
[14,15], even if they were composed of ensembles of dif-
ferent state vectors [16]. Suppose that Eve initially have
some partial information ( in terms of Shannon’s infor-
mation theory, the information I have a value between
0 and 1 in this case ) about the bases. Eve wants to in-
crease the information about the bases. However, since
the two ensemble give rise to statistically the same out-
comes to any quantum mechanical operations, she cannot
increase the information about the bases. Therefore we
can assume that Eve’s information about bases will re-
main zero if Eve’s initial one was zero. It means that Eve
cannot distinguish which basis is used and that the bases
sequence can be used repeatedly.
It should be noted that the indistinguishability be-
tween ensembles of particles corresponding to 1
2
|z+〉〈z+
|+ 1
2
|z−〉〈z−| and 1
2
|x+〉〈x+|+ 1
2
|x−〉〈x−| can be shown
by another physical argument. If they are distinguishable
we can implement the superluminal communications us-
ing the spin-version [17,18] of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) [19,18] experiment. Let the state of source parti-
cle pairs is the singlet one 1√
2
(|z+〉1|z+〉2 − |z−〉1|z−〉2)
(= 1√
2
(|x+〉1|x+〉2−|x−〉1|x−〉2) ). If, at site 1, one per-
forms spin-measurement along z (x) axis, the states of
particles given at site 2 is equivalent to 1
2
|z+〉〈z + | +
1
2
|z−〉〈z − | ( = 1
2
|x+〉〈x + | + 1
2
|x−〉〈x − | ). Thus if
the one at site 2 can distinguish between them, the one
at site 1 can send signal instantaneously to the one at
site 2, by performing spin-measurement along z or x axis
according to the binary sequence he wants to send.
As the bases sequence can be used repeatedly the key
tum memories until the time when they can extract maxi-
mal informations about the key. In this case, we deal with
the ancilla stored in quantum memories instead of records of
measurement. However, we will get the same result that the
two ensembles cannot be distinguished.
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can be distributed many times. However, it should be un-
derlined that the bases sequence have to be discarded af-
ter the expanded key is used for encrypting a message. It
is because a cryptogram gives partial information about
the key by which it is encrypted. With this informa-
tion about the key Eve can extract information about
the bases. For example, if Eve know that + ( or 0) is
encoded on a quantum carrier she intercepted and the
outcome of spin-measurement along x axis is + ( or up
state ), then she knows that it is more probable that the
basis is x axis. Thus, after a cryptogram encrypted using
the distributed key is announced, it must be taken into
account that Eve have considerable information about
the bases sequence. One may be concerned about the
fact that this information on bases may be a weak point
of the proposed scheme. However, this partial informa-
tion about bases is obtained after all the quantum car-
riers passed away Eve. Quantum cryptographic method
successfully works as long as Eve does not know the en-
coding bases while she has access to quantum carriers.
In BB84 scheme, indeed full information about bases is
publically announced after quantum carriers passed away
Eve. Taking into account this fact we can argue that the
proposed scheme is not weaker than the BB84 scheme in
this respect.
Similarly to BB84 scheme error check must be done in
the proposed scheme, too. Alice and Bob compare some
randomly chosen subset of their key. Bob inform publi-
cally to Alice whether he obtained + or − at the subset of
instances. Next, Alice compares the informed data with
her ones and check if there is error. Public discussion
will be also needed in later ’privacy amplification’ [6,7],
to eliminate discrepancies in bits which have not been
revealed.
In the proposed scheme, Alice and Bob prepare secure
random sequence ( which will be used as the bases se-
quence ) by courier method or BB84 method, before dis-
tributing the key. As shown before, the bases sequence
have to be discarded after a cryptogram encrypted by the
distributed key is announced. It is inconvenient for Alice
and Bob to prepare the bases sequence everytime they
distribute the key. It is possible to use more convenient
method: Alice and Bob leave some of the distributed key
in order to use it as basis sequence later. However, in
this case, Alice and Bob must keep the remaining key
securely, what is a disadvantage of this method.
We can conceive of the following indirect method for
obtaining information about bases sequence. Eve can
try various bases sequences, while listening to the public
communication channel and observing the behavior of
Alice and Bob. If the tried bases sequence is incorrect
one ( different from that of Alice and Bob ), error will be
detected by Alice and Bob and they will discard the data.
Now, Eve, seeing that they discard the data, knows that
the tried bases sequence is not a correct one. We can
estimate that for Eve to learn bases sequence of N -bits,
such indirect method should be performed at an order
of 2N times. This fact means that the indirect method
does not work for all practical purposes. Furthermore,
even the attack of the indirect method can be avoided by
delaying later steps until all quantum carriers arrive at
Bob.
To summarize, we can say that this paper provides a
simple variation of the basic ideas of the BB84 quantum
cryptographic scheme leading to a method of key expan-
sion. A secure random sequence ( the bases sequence )
determines the encoding bases in the proposed scheme.
Using the bases sequence repeatedly is proven to be safe
by quantum mechanical laws. There are three significant
advantages of the proposed method. First, public an-
nouncement of bases is not needed. Second, it reduces
information about bases to which Eve has access, which
can be utilized in the sophisticated eavesdropping strat-
egy. Third, there is no discarded data in ideal case, while
in BB84 scheme about half of data is discarded. There
is also a disadvantage of the method as Alice and Bob
must prepare a short secure random sequence to be used
as a bases sequence.
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